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BASELINE ANALYSIS: BROADENING
THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
The endless variety of our individualism means that we suffer
different kinds of pain and may well experience pain differently.
... If no one can really know another's pain, who shall decide
how to treat pain, and along what calculus? These are questions
of justice, not science. These are questions of complexity, not
justifications for passivity, because failing to notice another's
pain is an act with significance.1
Contemporary legal theorists continue to dispute whether or
not there can be objectivity in the law.2 Certain schools of legal
thought assert that objectively correct answers to legal problems
exist.' Such approaches, however, ignore the fact that every person
sees a given legal problem in a different light.4 Because of these
divergent perspectives, the possibility of an "objective" point of
view is impossible.5 Consequently, no single "correct" answer to a
legal question can exist.' Thus, one's perspective, embodied in
"baselines, '7 profoundly affects one's analysis of a problem and ul-
timately may determine its resolution." Because the choice of base-
line critically directs the judicial decision-making process, a court
should explicitly acknowledge and identify its choice in its legal
' Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv.
L. REV. 10, 11 (1987) (footnote omitted).
2 Beermann & Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Prop-
erty in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 912 (1989); see Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review)
76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 467 (1988) (reviewing L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960
(1986)) (questioning why law is form of politics which continues to be explosive).
3 Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 911-12; see infra notes 32-38 and accompanying
text.
4 See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 913; infra notes 41, 45-48 and accompanying
text.
5 See Minow, supra note 1, at 48 (Justice O'Connor implicitly acknowledged impossibil-
ity of objective observer by prefacing statement "in my view"); infra note 49 and accompa-
nying text.
6 See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 912-13.
See id. at 914-15; infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. "Baselines" are starting
points from which legal analysis proceeds. See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 915.
8 See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 914; infra notes 60-64 and accompanying
text.
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analysis.9
This Note, after situating baseline analysis within its historical
context, will explore its benefits both as a descriptive and norma-
tive tool. Then, it will illustrate baseline analysis by its application
to two recent constitutional law cases. Finally, this Note will advo-
cate broadening the judicial perspective by incorporating baseline
analysis into the judicial decision-making process.
I. LEGAL THOUGHT
A. Classical Legal Thought/Formalism
The "classical" school of thought10 espoused objectivity and
certainty in the law11 and believed that the law could be reduced to
a finite number of general principles or concepts readily applicable
to all facts and circumstances. 12 From these general concepts, spe-
cific legal rules could be generated through the process of deduc-
tion."' Moreover, such fundamental legal principles were thought
See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 915.
10 Representative classical legal scholars include Christopher C. Langdell, Samuel Wil-
liston, Joseph Beale, John Austin, and Sir William Blackstone. See R. SUMMERS, INSTRU-
MENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 136-59 (1982); Singer, supra note 2, at 496.
" See Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1983). Therefore, con-
siderations of justice, convenience, social context and the intent of the parties were irrele-
vant, except to the extent they were embodied in the abstract principles. See id. at 15.
12 See R. SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 138. These general principles form a universally
formal ordered system. Grey, supra note 11, at 11.
Judges commonly applied general principles without regard to the specific facts and
circumstances of the case. Singer, supra note 2, at 499; see R. SUMMERS, supra note 10, at
147 (judges treated statements made in prior cases as binding precedent without regard to
factual context). Adapting the rules to the individual circumstances or unique facts of a case
was discouraged because of the perceived potential for arbitrary and unpredictable results.
See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6-10, 18-20, 118-22, 125-31, 133 (1936). For this
reason, classical theory is sometimes referred to as "mechanical jurisprudence." See Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605-07 (1908).
13 Singer, supra note 2, at 497. An example of such formalistic reasoning is found in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The general principle is laid down as the major
premise of a deductive syllogism. Oliphant & Hewitt, Introduction to J. RUEFF, FROM THE
PHYSICAL TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INTRODUCTION TO A STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL
THEORY (1929), reprinted in W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE-UNDERSTANDING
AND SHAPING LAW-CASES, READING Commentary 437 (1987). The case under consideration
is the subject of the minor premise and the conclusion is derived from these two premises by
the operation of the laws of deductive logic. Id.
A significant aspect of classical thought was its commitment to the principles of laissez
faire and a self-regulating market. See Singer, supra note 2, at 477-82. The classical theo-
rists endeavored to separate the private sphere of freedom of contract from the public
sphere of government regulation. Id. at 478.
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to exist in the abstract. 4 Therefore, according to classical jurists,
judges did not make law; they merely "discovered" it.15
B. Legal Realism
Legal realists 6 rejected the notion of a legal system based on
transcendent legal concepts. 17 Instead, they embraced a functional
approach, which sought to define all concepts in terms of actual
experience.I s Legal concepts and rules were defined solely in terms
of judicial decisions.'" Since a judicial decision was itself consid-
14 See G. GiLMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42-43 (1977). This follows from the
proposition, first espoused by Christopher C. Langdell, that law is a science. Id. at 42; see
also Langdell, "Teaching Law as a Science," speech reprinted in 21 AM. L. REV. 123 (1887).
The principles had to be sufficiently abstract in order to cover the entire range of possible'
cases. Grey, supra note 11, at 12. These abstract concepts, however, could not be vague or
ambiguous. Id.
Due to this belief in abstract concepts of law, the approach of the classical theorists is
often referred to as the "transcendental approach." See Oliphant & Hewitt, supra note 13,
at x-xxi, xxv-xxvii. The general principles can be discerned through induction from existing
precedents. Id.
18 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70 (1st ed. 1890).
10 Representative legal realists include Morris and Felix Cohen, Walter Wheeler Cook,
Jerome Frank, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Karl Llewellyn, Herman Oliphant, and Roscoe
Pound.
17 See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 809, 821 (1935). The assault was on such abstractions as "title," "contract," "due pro-
cess," "fair value" and "vested rights." See id. at 823. According to Felix Cohen, the legal
concepts of the classical theorists are nothing more than unverifiable supernatural entities.
See id. at 821. Because these concepts are not defined in terms of either empirical fact or
ethics, any examination of social fact or policy is precluded. Id. at 820. By necessity, argu-
ments based on such concepts are irrefutable. Id. at 821. Such a system of jurisprudence
divorced from ethics and empirical facts is nothing more than "a branch of the science of
transcendental nonsense." Id.
The legal theorists also reject the notion of a finite system of general principles applica-
ble to all fact situations. See J. FRANK, supra note 12, at 6. "Even in a relatively static
society, men have never been able to construct a comprehensive eternized set of rules antici-
pating all possible legal disputes and settling them in advance." Id.
Moreover, the realists view the law as inherently uncertain. See id. at 6-7. The imper-
manent nature of the law was deemed to be socially desirable, because it enabled the law to
reflect the realities of ever-changing social and political conditions. Id.
18 See Cohen, supra note 17, at 821-49. "[I]nstead of assuming hidden causes or tran-
scendental principles behind everything we see or do, we are to redefine the concepts of
abstract thought as constructs, or functions ... of the things that we do actually see or do."
Id. at 826. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." 0. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 1 (1923).
19 See Cohen, supra note 17, at 828. "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897); see J. FRANK, supra note 12, at 126. The judge makes law
whenever she decides a case. Id. Moreover, it is considered the law of that case only, not the
law of future cases, although it may influence a judge in a future case. Id.
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ered to be a social event, a product of social forces20 as well as a
determinant of future social behavior,21 law was seen as a dynamic
social process.22 Viewing legal reasoning not as a matter of logical
deduction from fixed general principles,23 judges weighed and bal-
anced competing social policies and interests to arrive at a decision
that would best promote the public interest.24 According to legal
20 Cohen, supra note 17, at 843. A judicial decision is a product of such social determi-
nants as the economic, political, and professional background and activities of the judge. Id.
at 846.
21 Id. at 844. A decision is also a determination of future behavior in that it affects the
way people act. Id. at 843.
2 Id. at 844. Lawyers are like scientists engaged in the study of the behavior of human
beings. J. FRANK, supra note 12, at 129-30 (quoting Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of
the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457, 475-76 (1924)). Specifically, lawyers study the past
behavior of judges in order to be able to predict how they will behave in the future. See
Cohen, supra note 17, at 843-46. Therefore, a judicial decision can only take on meaning
when placed in context, i.e., its past and future. Id. at 844. Thus, the concept of law as a
complete system of static principles transcending time and circumstance is incorrect. Id. at
844-45.
2 Cohen, supra note 17, at 844-45. Nor does it involve the mechanical application of
rigid rules to cases without regard to their specific factual context. According to Karl Llew-
ellyn, legal rules are not "applied" by the judge; instead, they are reformulated-either ex-
panded or contracted-so that the case at hand is either covered by the rule definitively or
not at all. See Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 989, 1005
(1988) [hereinafter Case Law] (published in Germany in 1933). Moreover, Llewellyn has
contended that precedent is not binding, id. at 993, and the conception that precedent dic-
tates the result in cases is false. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 62 (1960)
[hereinafter COMMON LAW]. Often, precedent is not even followed, but serves merely to in-
fluence the judge. See Case Law, supra, at 992-93. A judge therefore has a considerable
degree of leeway in the decision-making process. See COMMON LAW, supra. A judge also has
leeway in that she decides what "the" facts are in a case. See Case Law, supra, at 997. A
case will come out differently depending on how the facts are treated. Id. This is often
reflected in differing versions of the statement of the facts as recounted by majority, concur-
ring and dissenting opinions of the same case. See id. at 996-98. Any interpretation of the
fact situation, Llewellyn has asserted, is neither right nor wrong; rather, each furthers a
different purpose. Id. at 998.
A judge encounters institutional constraints in the decision-making process. See id. at
995-96. Such constraints include the fact that a judge has been legally trained, and desires
to make her decision conform to existing legal doctrine. See id. at 995. A judge is further
constrained by the fact that she has internalized the rules and institutions. Id.; see also
COMMON LAW, supra, at 19-61 (discussing stabilizing factors in appellate judicial decision-
making process).
24 See Holmes, supra note 19, at 467. The very essence of the judicial task is to balance
opposing individual claims and determine which the law should favor to promote the social
welfare. See J. FRANK, supra note 12, at 120-21. It must take into account the social sci-
ences-psychology, economics, and politics-rather than logic. See Cohen, supra note 17, at
847.
In addition, judges must be conscious of the fact that they themselves make the law.
See J. FRANK, supra note 12, at 121. "[Tlhe self-delusion, that.., they are merely applying
the commands given them by some existing external authority, cannot but diminish their
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realists, the classical approach permitted courts to hide the value
judgments inherent in judicial decisions under the guise of objec-
tivity.25 As a consequence, realists maintained that legal criticism
suffered.26
The legal realists were not completely successful in their ap-
proach to legal reasoning since they failed to generate an alterna-
tive theory to formalism that would make normative argument
possible. Reacting to this flaw, contemporary schools of legal
thought, while continuing to espouse the basic premises of legal
realism, 28 have attempted to produce normative legal argument.29
Current schools, accordingly, have extended and reformed legal
realism.30
efficiency." Id.
The legal realists also criticized the classical thinkers' conception of a self-regulating
market system and their separation of private and public spheres. Singer, supra note 2, at
482. According to the realists, all market systems distribute power and wealth and thus
constitute regulatory systems. See id. The state, by failing to intervene in "private" transac-
tions, reinforces the existing distribution of wealth and thus privileges the interests of one
party over the interests of the other. Id.
15 See Cohen, supra note 17, at 841. According to the legal realists, classical definitions
of law were inadequate since they confused "what is" with "what ought to be." See id. at
836. The realists believed that every case presents a moral dilemma to the judge, which the
classical conception of law effectively hid. See id. at 840. The deductive approach was inade-
quate; two opposing general principles could always be formulated, each embodying a differ-
ent set of interests with which to decide a case. Oliphant & Hewitt, supra note 13. There-
fore, underlying the purported logical deductions of the classical judges were value
judgments, often unarticulated and even unconscious, as to the relative worth and impor-
tance of competing interests. See Holmes, supra note 19, at 466. The result was the perpetu-
ation of class prejudices and uncritical moral assumptions. Id.
2' Cohen, supra note 17, at 838.
27 See Singer, supra note 2, at 467-68. "Realists did relatively little to formulate new
criteria by which substantive legal outcomes could be evaluated." Ackerman, Book Review,
103 DAEDALUS 119, 122 (1974) (footnote omitted) (reviewing J. FRANK, supra note 12). Ac-
cording to Professor Singer, the approach espoused by the realists was flawed in terms of its
assumptions that judicial adjudication could be free of political underpinnings, that there
existed a commonly shared view of what constitutes the "public interest," and that contro-
versial legal problems could be resolved through an uncontroversial balancing process. See
Singer, supra note 2, at 502-03.
28 See Singer, supra note 2, at 503. For example, all the current schools reject the no-
tion that specific legal rules can be deduced from general abstract principles. See id. In
addition, almost all approaches employ the realists' metaphor of balancing competing poli-
cies and interests. See id.
21 Id. at 504.
30 See id. at 503-04. "All major current schools of thought are, in significant ways, prod-
ucts of legal realism." Id. at 467.
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C. Contemporary Legal Theory
Professor Singer has categorized contemporary legal theory
into six schools." He further divided these schools into two catego-
ries: "liberal" and "critical. 3 2 Liberal theories, 3 while adhering to
legal realism's basic tenets, recreate aspects of formalism in their
attempt to construct normative legal argument.3 4 By appealing to
impartial substantive criteria for judgment or to neutral decision-
31 See id. at 504; see also infra notes 33 & 39 and accompanying text (for discussion of
several of Professor Singer's schools of contemporary legal theory).
s2 See id. As would be expected, the politics of the two camps tend to differ. See Fiss,
The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2 (1986). Professor Singer identifies the
"liberal" movement with the right and the "critical" theories' movement with the left. See
id. Yet, both movements developed as a reaction to the jurisprudence of the sixties, which
saw "adjudication as the process for interpreting and nurturing a public morality." Id.
" See Singer, supra note 2, at 504. Professor Singer includes the schools of legal pro-
cess, rights theory, and law and economics in his liberal theories category. See id.
The legal process school emphasizes not substantive legal rules, but the process by
which legal institutions operate. Id. at 505. The basic premise is that legal rules are justified
if they are generated through appropriate procedures "by legitimate institutions keeping
within their proper roles." Id. According to legal process thinkers, the role of the courts is
limited to making decisions that can be based on general principles or standards both recon-
ciliable with past precedent and applicable to future cases. Id. at 505-07. Matters which
implicate policy choices typically involve political compromise or majority rule, and as such,
are best suited for, and therefore should be left to, the legislature. Id. Representative legal
process theorists include Henry Hart, Albert Sacks and Lou Fuller. Id. at 505-06.
The basic goal of the rights theorists is to identify legal rules to which all people would
consent if they thought about the problem of justice rationally. Id. at 509. This approach
distinguishes between principles of justice, about which people can agree, and principles of
morality, about which it is expected that people will not agree. Id. Legal rights, therefore,
are to be based on principles of justice which should be acceptable to all. Id. at 510. As to
the methodology for generating principles of justice, some legal rights theorists try to formu-
late a decision-making procedure for filtering community values. Id. Other theorists join
reasoned elaboration of community values, as embodied in existing practice and belief, with
an appeal to the judge's intuitive judgment about justice. Id. Representative rights theorists
include John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, Richard Epstein, and Bruce Acker-
man. See id. at 508-09.
The focus of the law and economics theorists is the maximization of social welfare
through economic cost/benefit analysis. Id. at 513-14. The social welfare is enhanced
through the concepts of "wealth maximization" or "efficiency." Id. at 513. Law and econom-
ics theorists strive to compare the costs and benefits of alternative allocations of entitle-
ments, and to identify legal rules that will maximize social welfare. Id. at 514. Costs and
benefits are valued according to how much one is willing and able to pay for an entitlement
given the pre-existing allocation of wealth. Id. Those willing to pay the highest prices for
entitlements are presumed to value them the most and are therefore believed to reap the
greatest social utility from such entitlements. Id. Representative law and economics scholars
include Richard Posner, Richard Coase, and Mark Kelman. See id. at 513-16 and accompa-
nying footnotes.
' Id. at 516.
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making procedures, 35 liberal theorists attempt to construct an ob-
jective standpoint from which judges can decide cases in a neutral
manner. 6 Thus, liberal theorists assume that there are objectively
"correct" answers, ascertainable by reference to such impartial cri-
teria or procedures. 7 Such reasoning closely mirrors the formalistic
thinking rejected by legal realism.38
In contrast, critical theories 9 have their basis in normative le-
gal argument without the reintroduction of formalistic elements.
40
Critical theorists reject the idea that answers to legal questions can
be derived from a noncontroversial, universally shared point of
view.41 Rather, schools such as critical legal studies recognize that
there are competing social visions or perspectives that cannot sim-
ply be dismissed,42 but which must be incorporated into normative
argument.43 It is suggested by some legal commentators that base-
line analysis accomplishes this objective.
II. BASELINE ANALYSIS
A. As a Descriptive Tool
Every attorney, judge, and layperson approaches any given le-
gal problem with a certain perspective or social vision.45 Such per-
3 Id. For example, law and economics theorists employ purportedly neutral criteria
such as efficiency and wealth maximization. See id. at 513-16. Legal process and rights theo-
rists attempt to employ impartial decision-making procedures based on community values.
See id. at 507-13.
" Id. at 516-17.
See id.
Id. at 516. The approach of the "liberal" theories assumes that everyone would reach
the same answer to a problem if they thought about it rationally. Id. at 517. This necessarily
implies that proper reasoning will lead to the "correct" answer. Id. Moreover, so that every-
one might agree, the principles or decision-making procedures must be stated in sufficiently
abstract terms. See id.
19 Id. at 504. Within this category, Professor Singer includes critical legal studies, femi-
nist legal theory, and law and society. Id.
40 Id. at 533.
41 Id.
42 Id. Different social visions exist precisely because people disagree as to what consti-
tutes a just or good society. Id.
43 Id. at 536-37. Professor Singer declares that true consensus arises from recognizing
competing perspectives, rather than from insisting upon a common viewpoint. Id. at 533.
"Contradiction all the way down is the route to a responsible, moral formulation of social
justice." Id. at 537.
" See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 914-15.
45 Id. at 913.
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spectives or visions vary based on experiences, values, gender, sex-
ual orientation, religion, race, and socioeconomic status.46 Because
one can never completely transcend her own experiences and bi-
ases, an objective perspective is unattainable. 4  For this reason,
"no one can see fully from another's point of view."4 Thus, the
existence of multiple perspectives eliminates the possibility of ob-
jectivity in the law"9 as well as the possibility of a universally "cor-
rect" answer to legal problems.
Furthermore, the existence of multiple perspectives helps to
explain why reasonable arguments can always be made on either
side of an issue50 and why law is, in essence, a matter of persua-
sion.' Since there is always more than one "correct" answer to a
46 See id.; see also Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phe-
nomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 521 (1986) (discussing effect of judge's life experiences
on predisposition to cases); Minow, supra note 1, at 46 ("what interests us, given who we are
and where we stand, affects our ability to perceive"). Professor Kennedy, adopting a judge's
personam, made the following observation: "I already have, as part of my life as I've lived it
up to this moment, a set of intentions, a life-project as a judge, that will orient me among
the many possible attitudes I could take to this work." Kennedy, supra.
47 Minow, supra note 1, at 48. "[N]o one is free from perspective. .. " Id. at 32.
11 Id. at 32. Total understanding of another is impossible due to "the social learning
and cultural baggage" every person carries. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1574, 1580 (1987).
Concededly, recognition and adoption of another's perspective requires effort. See id. at
1651; Minow, supra note 1, at 14. "The commitment to seek out and to appreciate a per-
spective other than one's own... is a difficult commitment to make and to fulfill. Aspects of
language, social structure, and political culture steer in the opposite direction: toward asser-
tions of absolute categories transcending human choice or perspective." Id. However, these
difficulties do not excuse the decision-maker from attempting to take on others' perspec-
tives. See Henderson, supra, at 1651.
4 Minow, supra note 1, at 14. What initially appears to be an objective position ap-
pears biased from another point of view. Id.
.. See Singer, Persuasion, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2442, 2443 (1989). Each party to a legal
dispute views the matter from a completely different-usually opposite-perspective. Id.;
see also Case Law, supra note 23, at 992 ("almost every case on appeal to a court of last
resort could be decided just as easily, legally speaking, for the plaintiff as for the
defendant").
The existence of multiple perspectives also accounts for concurring and dissenting opin-
ions in judicial decisions. Id. at 997 n.2. According to Karl Llewellyn, separate opinions have
value in that they each approach the case from a different "vantage point," each embodying
a new perspective, thus "lend(ing] . . . a depth dimension to decisions." Id.
51 See Singer, supra note 50, at 2442. Lawyers devote much of their time to persuasion;
they try to persuade the judge to rule in favor of their clients. Id. Law professors spend time
teaching their students how to persuade. Id. Judges, in their opinions, try to persuade
others that their ruling on a case is legally valid. Id. Lawyering requires problem-solving
which involves "trying to persuade others to act in ways that will change the world into
something closer to what we desire." Lopez, Law Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1984);
see White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52
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legal problem, and because a purely objective answer is unascer-
tainable through logical reasoning, 52 persuasion will dictate the
choice from among several possible answers. Understanding the
perspective of another is a "precondition to persuasion."53 While
persuasion does not convince others to change their values,54 it
does force others to become aware of values they already have; val-
ues that they did not initially consider relevant to the matter at
hand.5 By adopting a different perspective, such values become
apparent and relevant to the observer.5 8
Perspectives are manifested in "baselines" 57  or "vantage
U. Cm. L. REv. 684, 684 (1985) ("law is most usefully seen not... as a system of rules, but
as a branch of rhetoric").
52 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
61 Singer, supra note 50, at 2457.
Id. at 2456.
5Id.
88 Id. at 2457-58. Professor Singer employed a horse and rider illustration to demon-
strate the process of persuasion:
Perhaps, then, persuasion starts by creating a relationship between oneself and
others. Such a relationship does not connect people who were unconnected; it
makes them aware of the connections they already have. The relationship changes
who one is. In so doing, it clarifies what one really thinks .... Persuasion begins
when the rider notices the horse, and the fact that the horse cannot speak. The
rider can never know what the horse knows. To get even a glimpse of what the
horse is thinking, the rider must look the horse in the eye. But to do that, the
rider must get down off the horse and walk a little way. Persuasion is what hap-
pens when the rider turns around.
Id. at 2458.
17 See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 914. Professors Beermann and Singer attri-
bute the use of the term "baseline" to the work of Jeremy Paul, Cass Sunstein, and Duncan
Kennedy. Id. Professor Paul explored the operation of baselines in the regulatory takings
doctrine. See Paul, Searching for the Status Quo, 7 CARDozo L. REv. 743 (1986). Paul
demonstrated that the takings doctrine depends on one's starting point (i.e., baseline). See
id. at 750.
Professor Kennedy has applied baseline analysis to economic analysis. See Kennedy,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 428-29
(1981). Specifically, Kennedy argued that cost-benefit analysis of entitlements is impossible
without an "entitlement background," i.e., a baseline against which to measure a proposed
change in entitlements. See id. Choice of baseline implicates a value choice, effectively re-
butting the notion of objectivity and neutrality in efficiency analysis. See id. at 389.
Professor Sunstein has analyzed baselines within the context of constitutional law. See
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 passim (1987). He argued that many
current constitutional doctrines proceed from a common-law baseline from which the con-
cepts of neutrality and state inaction may be measured. See id. at 875.
Professors Beermann and Singer applied baseline analysis to the issue of job security.
See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, passim. They argued that judges are reluctant to
recognize workers' claims for job security because they proceed from baselines which create
a "presumption against job security. . . ." See id. at 919.
1991]
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points, ' 58 i.e., starting points from which analysis begins.5" The
choice of a baseline, whether explicit or implicit, affects the resolu-
tion of legal issues.60 A baseline, the embodiment of a particular
moral or political value,"' affects the way in which a legal issue is
conceptualized and stated, which in turn affects the nature of the
argument.6 2 In essence, baselines determine what is central or im-
portant and what is peripheral or unimportant in any legal prob-
lem." By skewing the analysis, choice of baseline essentially cre-
ates a presumption, thereby allocating the burden of proof in favor
of the party whose position is founded on the value underlying the
baseline. 4
Prevailing baselines tend to privilege the status quo 5 because
existing societal and economic arrangements are assumed to be
neutral.6 Since the status quo is viewed as good, natural and freely
chosen,67 these assumptions are rarely questioned or even expressly
recognized.6 8
Although baselines and their underlying values invariably in-
5 See Minow, supra note 1, at 13-14. Professor Minow applied baseline analysis, which
she referred to as "vantage point," to the legal treatment of difference, specifically address-
ing the differences among people in terms of gender, race, ethnicity and religion. Id. Accord-
ing to Minow, the concept of difference is relative, i.e., it is only meaningful in terms of a
comparison. Id. at 13. This point of comparison, or reference point, reflects a point of view.
See id. at 14. By recognizing points of comparison and viewpoints, problems of difference
become linked to questions of "vantage point." Id. By applying baseline analysis, "what
initially appears to be a fixed and objective difference may seem from another viewpoint like
the subordination or exclusion of some people by others." Id.
'9 Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 915.
60 Id. at 914-15. Professors Beermann and Singer noted the prevailing tendency of
courts to reject workers' claims to job security and cite existing baselines that favor the
employer as a primary reason for this trend. Id. at 915.
61 Id. at 916.
62 See id. at 915. Different perspectives lead to different arguments. Id. at 925.
63 Id. at 937; see Case Law, supra note 23, at 997-98. "This is what one looks for...
[and] what one has a tendency to emphasize, overlooking elements in themselves no less
important." Id. at 998 (emphasis in original).
Beermann and Singer, supra note 2, at 937.
65 Id. at 919. Specifically, baselines favor the existing distribution of power and wealth
in the marketplace. Id. Regarding the issue of job security, managerial power appears natu-
ral and inevitable, whereas worker security is viewed as an unwarranted interference with
the free market. Id. In the area of economic analysis, the baseline used in cost-benefit analy-
sis of entitlements is the existing distribution of income and entitlements. See Kennedy,
supra note 57, at 389-90. In constitutional law analysis, the status quo is used as the base-
line from which to measure state action. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 882.
Minow, supra note 1, at 54.
6, Id. at 55. For example, common-law categories are deemed to be prepolitical and a
part of nature, rather than a social or legal construct. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 879.
68 See Minow, supra note 1, at 55.
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fluence the analysis and outcome of a legal problem, judges gener-
ally fail to acknowledge their existence and operation. 9 This may
be because the baseline is so powerful and well-entrenched that it
may be overlooked. 0 Even judges who are aware of their perspec-
tive may simply assume that it is universal, superior to that of
others,7 1 irrelevant, or unimportant. 2 As a result, the political and
moral values that are embodied in baselines are hidden within le-
gal discourse under the guise of objectivity and neutrality.7" Be-
cause baselines serve as starting points and are not explicitly rec-
ognized, they tend to suppress any discussion of the moral and
0' See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 919; Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court,
1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43, 49 (1989).
Speaking of the Rehnquist Court, Professor Chemerinsky stated "the Justices never ac-
knowledge ... value choices nor discuss permissible types of value judgments." Id.
70 See Minow, supra note 1, at 39. Baselines may be so well established and powerful
that even theorists and commentators who argue for adopting the perspective of another
may fall prey to their power. See id. at 60. When criticizing existing legal doctrine, commen-
tators and dissenting judges often proceed from the same unstated baseline. See Beermann
& Singer, supra note 2, at 922. "[T]hey often repeat in new contexts new versions of the old
assumptions they set out to challenge." Minow, supra note 1, at 61. This has the unfortu-
nate effect of perpetuating the existing baseline. See id. at 40.
7' See Minow, supra note 1, at 54.
7 Id. at 51. This often occurs through the use of stereotypes. Id. Stereotypical thinking,
i.e., the failure to acknowledge the individuality of people, results from the failure to notice
the perspective of another. Id. at 51 n.201.
73 See Beermann and Singer, supra note 2, at 916. Professor Chemerinsky has charac-
terized the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence as a "search for judicial neutrality." Chemerin-
sky, supra note 69, at 48 (footnote omitted). For examples of the Rehnquist Court's rhetoric
on neutrality and avoidance of value imposition, see id. at 89 n.202; see also Minow, supra
note 1, at 44-45 ("[u]nstated [baselines] lie hidden in legal discourse, which is full of the
language of abstract universalism").
A judge knows the outcome of a case before he drafts the opinion. Case Law, supra
note 23, at 992; see Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am. L. REv. 1
(1870), reprinted in 44 HARV. L. REv. 725, 725 (1931) ("[i]t is the merit of the common law
that it decides the case first and determines the principles afterwards"). A judge then writes
an opinion in order to justify and legitimize his decision. See Case Law, supra note 23, at
992.
There are several reasons why a judge wishes to justify or "legalize" his decision. See
Kennedy, supra note 46, at 527-28. First, the judge has a commitment to the public to
decide cases "according to the law" and must therefore persuade the public that he has
upheld this commitment. Id. at 527. Second, if the ruling is without any legal basis whatso-
ever, the judge will be subject to the disapproval of his colleagues for having stepped beyond
the bounds of his authority. Id. Third, the more persuasive the legal argument, the less
likely the judge will be reversed. Id. Fourth, by writing a persuasive opinion, the judge may
be able to influence the outcomes of subsequent cases or even affect popular consciousness.
Id. at 527-28. Fifth, a persuasive opinion will enhance the judge's credibility and reputation,
thus affecting what the judge can do in subsequent cases. Id. at 528.
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political choices that orient an analysis.74 In this way, baselines
tend to mask "the political underpinnings of legal rules. '7 5
The nonrecognition of perspectives is dangerous in that it
leads to the failure to acknowledge minority and dissenting per-
spectives.7 6 "[A] judicial stance that treats its own perspective as
unproblematic makes other perspectives invisible and puts them
beyond discussion.' '7 As a result, the views of the majority or of
those in power may prevail, and may be confused with reason 8 or
with reality itself."
B. As a Normative Argument
Baseline analysis does not yield a specific answer to a legal
problem80 in and of itself. Eventually, an answer must be reached.
Inevitably, one baseline must be chosen from among several com-
peting ones. By necessity, this involves choosing one value over an-
other.8 1 This potentially leads back to the central dilemma con-
fronting legal realists and liberal theorists: determining which
value should dictate, or more specifically, which baseline should
control, when .no single baseline is acceptable to all. Since one
value must be chosen, elements of formalistic thinking are poten-"
7, Beermann and Singer, supra note 2, at 915-16.
75 Id. at 916. Professor Chemerinsky has written that with regard to constitutional law
cases, the Supreme Court's quest for neutrality results in inconsistent approaches to consti-
tutional interpretation. See Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at 51. According to Chemerinsky,
in its effort to avoid value imposition, the Supreme Court failed to develop a coherent the-
ory of constitutional interpretation. Id. "[T]he Rehnquist Court insists on principles exter-
nal to the Justices' values, but offers no guidance as to what constitutes such principles or
how they are to be determined." Id.
71 See Beermann and Singer, supra note 2, at 913. Failure to recognize perspectives
leads to the assumption that one can see and understand everything. Id.
77 Minow, supra note 1, at 53 (footnote omitted).
78 See Beermann & Singer, supra note 2, at 913. By failing to recognize the significance
of perspective and the political nature of law, the power holder can claim that his view is a
general one and that the rule or policy he is implementing is the one that any rational
person would accept. See Singer, supra note 2, at 540-41.
71 See Minow, supra note 1, at 66-67. The viewpoint of the power holder may acquire
the "earmarks of factuality." Id. at 67. Moreover, the prevailing conception of reality may
convince even those injured by it of its actuality. Id. "[Plolitical and cultural success itself
submerges the fact that conceptions of reality represent a perspective of some groups, not a
picture of reality free from any perspective." Id. (footnote omitted).
11 See id. at 75.
11 Id. The view that is ultimately used to resolve a conflict is only a partial view. Id.
Although a competing perspective may inform the discourse and challenge the prevailing
perspective, it is at best a "corrective lens, another partial view, not absolute truth." Id. at
75-76 (footnote omitted).
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tially reintroduced into the analysis.
Although it does not eliminate the necessity of having to
choose one value or policy over another, the use of baseline analy-
sis in adjudication renders that choice more informed and there-
fore, it is hoped, more just.82 Addressing more perspectives will
lead to a more informed discourse and analysis.8 3 Consequently, a
decision-maker may see all the complexities involved 84 and may
notice an injury she had previously overlooked or take more seri-
ously a harm she had simply disregarded in the past.85 Also, she
may realize that her outlook is not necessarily the only one or the
"right" ones8 and may even decide that the status quo is neither
"inevitable [n]or ideal. 81 7 Ideally, baseline analysis will enable a
decision-maker to examine all possible perspectives and possibly
lead to the substitution of the prevailing baseline with a more ap-
propriate one. In sum, examining the perspective of others may
"lead to revolutions in habitual legal thinking and transformation
of legal problems."88 By initially focusing on several baselines and
treating them as equally meritorious, formalistic reasoning is
avoided in the analytic process. "Justice, in this view, is not ab-
stract, universal, or neutral. Instead, justice is a quality of human
engagement with multiple perspectives.""
Moreover, by making baseline analysis an express element of
the adjudicative process, the decision-maker would be compelled
to recognize and justify explicitly her value or baseline choice in
her written opinions.90 Legal opinions would arguably be written
more candidly and justly.9 1 If this view were adopted, judges, com-
82 See Henderson, supra note 48, at 1576.
83 See Beermarm & Singer, supra note 2, at 914. By attempting to understand the situ-
ation and experience of another, more meanings become available to legal discourse. See
Henderson, supra note 48, at 1577. Professor Henderson stated that "empathy" is often
achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the other. Id. at 1580-81.
4 See Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at 102.
85 See Minow, supra note 1, at 72; Henderson, supra note 48, at 1653.
86 See Minow, supra note 1, at 60; Henderson, supra note 48, at 1653.
87 See Minow, supra note 1, at 16.
88 See Henderson, supra note 48, at 1577.
88 Minow, supra note 1, at 60; see also Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate
Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 73 CORNELL L. Rav. 1004, 1006 (1988)
(appellate court must "bring the full measure of every human capacity to bear in resolving"
cases).
80 See Beermann and Singer, supra note 2, at 915; Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at 61.
81 See Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at 60. A rejection of the Supreme Court's rhetoric
of neutrality "will force the Court to explain and defend its value choices more openly." Id.
This, in turn, may lead to a greater public awareness and understanding of the issues in-
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pelled to discuss the value judgments and policy choices implicated
in each case, would be precluded from relying upon formalistic rea-
soning to justify their written opinions. Baseline analysis would, in
effect, serve as a check on the decision-making process.92
More significantly, where one's perspective was premised upon
an empirical assumption about the world, baseline analysis could
prove the empirical assumption erroneous.9 3 If the empirical as-
sumption is inaccurate, it follows that the entire analysis predi-
cated on that assumption is flawed. Under such circumstances, the
substitution of such a baseline for one based upon accurate empiri-
cal conceptions of the world would eliminate the necessity of mak-
ing a value choice and lessen the likelihood of formalistic
reasoning.
C. Application
The United States Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services94 illustrates the
potential influence of baselines upon the outcome of a case. In
DeShaney, the plaintiffs, a mother and her child who had been
severely beaten by his father, brought a section 1983 claim against
social workers and other local officials 95 alleging deprivation of lib-
erty in violation of the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause." The action was premised on the ground that the state,
volved. Id. at 102.
92 See Minow, supra note 1, at 94. "Judicial power is least accountable when judges
leave unstated-and treat as given-the perspective they select." Id.
Professor Minow formulated two exercises to aid the decision maker in recognizing the
perspectives of others. See id. at 79-82. The first exercise calls for an examination of one's
own attitude toward the stereotyping of people deemed to be different, as well as one's
method of categorizing the world. Id. at 79-80. The second entails a search for and celebra-
tion of differences and similarities in an effort to establish new bases for connection. Id. at
80-81. One way to do this is by simply trying to understand how the other person under-
stands. Id.
Professor Minow cautioned against responding to the existence of multiple perspectives
with passivity. See id. at 82. Such a response is not neutral; rather, it favors the status quo.
Id. at 82-83.
'3 See Beermann and Singer, supra note 2, at 920. For example, these empirical as-
sumptions may be based upon subjective ideological premises reflecting the judge's social
class, experiences, and education, rather than upon objective fact. See id. at 931-33. The
decision maker then evaluates competing empirical claims based upon the ideological as-
sumptions embodied in the baseline. Id. at 933.
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
,' See id. at 191. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
, See id. at 191.
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through its affirmative actions and words, undertook to protect the
child, thereby acquiring an affirmative duty to do so in a reasona-
bly competent manner.97 In response, the Court concluded that the
state had no constitutional duty to protect the child from his fa-
ther's repeated violence. 8
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, employed a base-
line that the Constitution contains no positive rights.9 9 Under such
a view, any claim seemingly dependent upon such rights was auto-
matically rendered suspect.100 Based on this premise, the Court fo-
cused on the state's general lack of an affirmative duty to provide
protective services, rather than the specific acts undertaken by the
state, which, in and of themselves, may have given rise to a duty of
reasonable care.10'
The majority's baseline, reflected throughout the entire opin-
ion, first appeared in the Court's statement of the issue: whether
the state has an affirmative duty to protect its citizens. 102 From the
outset, the majority 'rejected the notion that a state has an affirma-
tive obligation to provide services to its citizens.103 Since the claim
was viewed as one concerning inaction on the part of the state, 04 it
was "logical" for the Court to hold that the "[S]tate's failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not con-
stitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." 05 Given its initial
97 See id. at 197. The state's affirmative actions, allegedly giving rise to its duty to
protect the child include: taking temporary custody of the child, returning him to his fa-
ther's custody and periodic visits by a caseworker. Id. at 192-94.
98 Id. at 196-97. The due process "[c]lause is . . .a limitation on the state's power to
act, not.., a guarantee of certain minimum levels of safety and security." Id.
9 Id. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101 See id. (Brennan. J., dissenting).
102 See id. at 194. The Court viewed the issue as: "[WIhen, if ever, the failure of a state
or local governmental entity or its agents to provide an individual with adequate protective
services constitutes a violation of the individual's due process rights." Id. The court's bias is
also reflected in the manner in which it described the petitioners' claim: "Petitioners con-
tend that the State deprived [the child] of his liberty interest... by failing to provide him
with adequate protection against his father's violence." Id. at 197 (footnote and citation
omitted).
103 See id. at 195. The Court began its analysis with a discussion of the due process
clause "as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal
levels of safety and security." Id.
I" See id. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court stated that" '[t]he most that can
be said of the state functionaries in this case,' . . . is that they stood by and did nothing
when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role ... " Id. at 203 (emphasis
added).
105 See id. at 197. The Court maintained that because the state is not required to pro-
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baseline, the Court summarily dismissed the petitioners' argument
that the particular actions taken by the state gave rise to an af-
firmative duty to protect the child,106 narrowly construing prior
case law which recognized such an affirmative duty.107 Thus, the
Court held that the plaintiffs' claim did not fall within the limited
exception embraced by these prior cases. 108
Justice Brennan, dissenting, approached the issue from a dif-
ferent perspective. 09 His baseline recognized that under certain
circumstances, state action may indeed impose positive duties." 0
According to Justice Brennan, the majority misstated the issue."'
Justice Brennan would focus on the acts that the state had taken,
rather than on those it failed to take and would, therefore, frame
the issue as whether the state's action conferred an affirmative
duty to protect the child. 112 Given this baseline, Justice Brennan
construed prior cases broadly, thereby including the plaintiffs'
claim within their scope."' In his analysis, Justice Brennan fo-
cused on the specific acts of the state that could have given rise to
vide protective services, it cannot be held liable for injuries that could have been avoided
had it chosen to provide such services. Id.
106 Id. at 198-99. The petitioners argued that the state's actions created a "special rela-
tionship" with respect to the child, giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect him in a
reasonably competent manner. Id. at 197.
107 See id. at 198-200. The Court read these cases as standing for the proposition that
an affirmative duty arises only when the state takes a person into its custody, either through
incarceration or institutionalization, thereby depriving him of his freedom to act on his own
behalf. Id. at 199-200.
108 See id. at 201.
109 See id. at 203-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explicitly recognized the
importance of perspective in his dissenting opinion: "This is more than a quibble over dicta;
it is a point about perspective, having substantive ramifications." Id. at 204 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
See id. at 211-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan asserted that the issue as
the majority perceived it was not even raised in the case-it was never raised in the com-
plaint or on appeal, nor was it addressed in the briefs. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 206-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan read the prior cases as
standing for the general proposition that an affirmative duty to protect an individual arises
where a state, through its acts, cuts off private sources of aid. See id. at 207 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Brennan, the majority incorrectly decided that it was the
state's act of physically restraining the individual that amounted to the deprivation of lib-
erty. See id. at 205-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For Justice Brennan, it was the fact that
the state denied the individual access to other sources of aid that constituted the depriva-
tion, not the fact of physical restraint. See id. at 206 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Therefore,
where the state's knowledge and expression of interest in protecting an individual effectively
cut off other sources of aid, the state acquires a positive duty. See id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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an affirmative duty" 4 and criticized the majority's formalistic at-
tempt to draw a sharp line between state action and inaction."1 5
Justice Brennan placed great weight on the existence of a state
child-welfare system "specifically designed to help children like
Joshua [DeShaney] ' ' 116 and described in detail the acts taken by
the Department of Social Services in DeShaney.17 Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the existence of an active child-welfare pro-
gram effectively discouraged other citizens from taking additional
steps to protect a child once they had notified the Department of
Social Services of the suspected abuse." 8
In DeShaney, the Court could have come out either way while
remaining within the confines of existing legal doctrine. 1 9 The
Court reached its result because of the initial baseline that it se-
lected. 20 The different baselines articulated and applied by the
majority and dissent demonstrate the different perspectives from
which they viewed the plaintiffs' claim. 121 Specifically, they reflect
competing visions as to what constitutes ordinary and desirable
government activity.
22
For Justice Rehnquist, the preferred norm was government
114 See id. at 208-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's baseline led him to
scrutinize the facts in greater detail than the majority. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Therefore, the facts became the focal point of his analysis. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Indeed, Justice Brennan cited facts that are not even mentioned by the majority. See id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was thus led to the conclusion that there was an
affirmative duty imposed upon the state. See id. at 211-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"" See id. at 206-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
" See id. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan described in detail the
function and duties of the Department of Social Services and the control it had over the
decision whether or not to provide a child with protection from alleged abuse. See id. at
208-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These factors were ignored by the majority. See id. at 191-
203.
.. See id. at 208-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, Justice Brennan considered
it significant that a social worker periodically visited the DeShaney home, recorded her ob-
servations of apparent child abuse and then failed to do anything about it. See id. at 209
(Brennan, J., dissenting). This fact was summarily dismissed by the majority. See id. at 202.
118 See id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan recognized that children
may be better off without the existence of such a program. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1" See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
120 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22 See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 886-88. "Such a decision [that adequate child pro-
tection should not be a constitutional entitlement] reflects deeply engrained views about the
degree of governmental obligations and the social context in which they apply-a decision
that is, by its very nature, political." The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 137, 175 (1989) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
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neutrality and inaction.12 s However, this political judgment was
hidden by his formalistic conception of state "action" versus "inac-
tion. 1 24 To distinguish between "action" and "inaction," Justice
Rehnquist adopted a version of the status quo baseline, specifi-
cally, the distribution of entitlements as they existed at common
law. 1 25 Under this approach, any deviation from the common law
would be deemed an impermissible violation of the principle of
neutrality. 2  Relying on the intent of the framers, 27 Justice Rehn-
quist determined that at common law the state had no affirmative
duty to provide protective services. 28 Given this baseline, he inevi-
tably concluded that the state's inaction did not violate the plain-
tiff child's constitutional rights. 12 e
It is possible that Justice Rehnquist reached this conclusion
because he failed to examine the perspectives of the child and his
mother in assessing the state's obligation. He may have failed to
appreciate truly the pain and injury suffered by the child, as well
as the pain and frustration suffered by his mother. 130 Had he done
:2 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
124 See Leading Cases, supra note 122, at 168. Using formalistic discourse, the Court
portrayed itself as adhering obediently to the rule of law. See id. ("Court took refuge in a
silence resonating with unspoken premises and unstated values").
125 See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 875.
126 See id. at 879. In essence, "the state action inquiry is not a search for whether the
state has 'acted,' but instead an examination of whether it has deviated from functions that
are perceived as normal and desirable" under the common law. Jd. at 887.
127 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196. "The Framers were content to leave the extent of
governmental obligation [to protect its citizens] ... to the democratic political processes."
Id.
128 See id. The Court stated that the "cases have recognized that the Due Process
Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid." Id.
The United States Constitution has consistently been interpreted as failing to impose
upon the states an affirmative duty to ensure the welfare of its citizenry. See Bowers v.
Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it
tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to
provide services"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). In Bowers, the court held that the
state has no constitutional duty to protect the public from dangerous madmen. See id. at
619; see also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (fourteenth
amendment for protection against governmental oppression, not for provision of governmen-
tal services), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). The description of the Constitution as a
charter of negative rights implies that there is no constitutional right to any welfare bene-
fits. See Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. Rav. 864, 864
(1986). This interpretation is supported by the language of the due process clause, which is
phrased as a proscription, i.e., "nor shall any State," rather than an affirmative mandate. Id.
at 864-65. Moreover, the state cannot "deprive" its citizens of certain rights. Id. at 865. This
suggests a prohibition against aggressive state action rather than a denial of protections. Id.
129 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202.
2"0 See Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57
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so, perhaps he would have found, as did the dissent, that the
state's "inaction" as to the child was indeed action.131
The dissent recognized that the common law is not always the
appropriate baseline for constitutional analysis.3 2 in that the com-
mon-law conception of the role of the state was largely repudiated
with the New Deal. 3 3 In modern times, a "positive" state has
emerged, 134 and the distinction between "action" and "inaction"
has become increasingly blurred. 35 It has also become apparent
that in some instances the common law is neither natural nor neu-
tral.1 38 Rather, the common law has been recognized as a way of
embodying a particular social theory serving some interests at the
expense of others. 37 Consequently, blind adherence to the com-
mon-law baseline itself may constitute "action."'383 It would there-
fore seem more appropriate, in certain instances, to substitute for
the common-law baseline one independent of the common law: one
that embraces the principles of social justice that have been
adopted since the New Deal. 39 Accordingly, Justice Brennan's per-
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (1989) (Justice Rehnquist's opinion "demonstrates moral
insensitivity").
131 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"3 Sunstein, supra note 57, at 903-04.
Id. at 904. Specifically, Lochner-like premises of neutrality and inaction have been
rejected by the New Deal, id. at 903, and have been replaced with the view that aggressive
governmental action is necessary, id. at 902.
"4 See Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1984). The reach of appropriate state action "has
extended far into areas previously reserved to the family, market and church." Id. at 1326.
Moreover, as Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald has pointed out, "[t]he neediest of our citizens
are most conspicuously dependent on government largesse for the satisfaction of their most
basic needs. But even those of us who are comparatively self-sufficient could hardly function
in the modern world without relying on services and institutions provided by government."
Wald, Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 263
(1990).
1'5 See Kreimer, supra note 134, at 1325. "In a positive state, all rights are to some
extent positive, for the government is often in a position to deal mortal blows to the exercise
of rights by simply ceasing to intervene." Id. at 1326. As the government becomes increas-
ingly involved in the lives of its citizens by providing various services, the denial of such
services cannot be deemed to be of no constitutional significance. See Wald, supra note 134,
at 250. To do otherwise would give government "almost infinite power to control and manip-
ulate every aspect of our daily lives." Id.
138 See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 423
(1987).
37 Id.
138 Id. at 502.
13' See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 907. Professor Sunstein suggested that a new base-
line could be generated "through some theory of justice, to be derived from the language
and animating purposes of the text [of the Constitution] and based to a greater or lesser
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spective placed more responsibility on the state and imposed an
affirmative duty upon it under a greater range of circumstances. 140
Justice Brennan, therefore, interpreted the Constitution broadly, 4 1
determining that under certain circumstances, "inaction" may
have constitutional significance. 42 To the DeShaney majority, in-
action was "neutral;' ' 43 to the dissent, "inaction [could] be every
bit as abusive ... as action.' 4 4
The dissent assessed the state's conduct from the perspective
of the child and his mother. From this baseline, the dissent recog-
nized that the state had affirmatively extended its protection to
the child and turned its back on him when he was most vulnerable,
even though it was in a position to help him. 145
Thus it is evident that the Court's perspective in DeShaney
profoundly influenced the nature of its discourse and reasoning.
Since the analysis of the majority was arguably skewed, it created
an additional hurdle for the child and his mother to overcome in
order to recover against the state. As explicitly recognized by Jus-
tice Brennan, the Court virtually "preordain[ed]" the result. 46
Similarly, Bowers v. Hardwick 47 illustrates how baselines, and
the perspectives they embody, influence the outcome of a deci-
degree on existing interpretations." Id.
1I See supra note 113 and accompanying text; see also Soifer, supra note 130, at 1515
("dissenters' worldview involves a complex continuum rather than a world that can be run
with a simple on/off switch").
" See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "I cannot agree that our
Constitution is indifferent to such indifference [on the part of the state toward the child]."
Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Blackmun would interpret the Constitution and consti-
tutional precedents in light of "the dictates of fundamental justice." Id. at 213 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent thus recognized that under the
facts of DeShaney, failure to provide a service constituted action. See id. "It simply belies
reality, therefore, to contend that the State 'stood by and did nothing' with respect to [the
child]." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Chief Judge Wald observed, "[t]he Court could
conclude that this was a case of inaction only by focusing on a narrowly defined slice of
time-the moment at which [the child's] father struck the crippling blows-and by ignoring
the broader context produced by the sum of the state's actions." Wald, supra note 134, at
262.
14 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
144 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Wald, supra note 134,
at 262-63 ("[g]overnment inaction vis-a-vis a particular individual may be highly
unneutral").
14 See id. at 211 (Brennan, J. dissenting). The State had the opportunity and the
means to aid Joshua because it had knowledge of the child's predicament as well as the
authority to remove him from his father's custody. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'6 Id. (Brennan J., dissenting).
147 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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sion.148 In Bowers, Mr. Hardwick, a homosexual, brought suit to
challenge the constitutionality of a state statute criminalizing con-
sensual sodomy,149 applicable to heterosexuals as well as homosex-
uals.150 Upon review of this issue, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute. 5'
The baseline of Justice White, writing for the majority, was
that there is no constitutional right for homosexuals to engage in
sodomy.'52 Because of this initial baseline, the Court's analysis fo-
cused exclusively on homosexual conduct, notwithstanding the fact
that the statute applied equally to heterosexuals.5 3
The Court's baseline was reflected in its statement of the is-
sue: "[w]hether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates
the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal
and have done so for a very long time."' 54 In analyzing this issue,
the Court determined that there was no fundamental right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy based on the proposition that
"[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots."' 5 Fur-
ther, the Court construed prior precedent narrowly in order to find
that the right to privacy did not extend to homosexual conduct. 5 '
148 It is important to note that the approach advocated by baseline analysis can be
applied to almost any case with controversial elements. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.
Ct. 2533, 2538-39 (1989) (state perspective of preserving national symbol versus defendant's
perspective of free speech); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (state perspective of
curbing illegal immigration versus plaintiffs' perspective of education for their children);
University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-70 (1978) (university perspec-
tive of racial and cultural diversity versus plaintiff's perspective of equal access to educa-
tion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (state perspective of compulsory educa-
tion versus Amish perspective of preservation of traditional religious lifestyle).
140 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
150 See id. at 188 n.1.
,:' Id. at 196.
112 Id. at 192.
153 See id. at 190-96.
14 See id. at 190.
15 Id. at 192. To justify its conclusion, the majority embarked on an analysis of the
purported historical treatment of homosexuals by the state. See id. at 192-94; see also id. at
196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[c]ondemnation of [homosexual] . . . practices is firmly
rooted in Judeao-Christian [sic] moral and ethical standards"). The Court characterized
fundamental rights as those "liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.'" Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). Based
on its historical analysis, the Court concluded that the right of homosexuals to engage in
sodomy could not be deemed a fundamental right. Id.
" See id. at 190-91. According to the Court, the right to privacy extends to the spheres
of family, marriage, and procreation, with which homosexual activity has no connection. Id.
at 191.
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The Court's baseline also enabled it to quickly dismiss the respon-
dent's argument that there was no rational basis for the statute,
concluding that "majority sentiments about the morality of homo-
sexuality" were adequate to validate the statute. 57
The analysis of the dissent, authored by Justice Blackmun,
proceeded from the baseline that the right to privacy extended to
the right of intimate association, whether homosexual or heterosex-
ual. 15a According to Justice Blackmun, the majority misstated the
issue' 59 by failing to view it as implicating the right to decide how
to conduct one's intimate relationships. 6 0 Therefore, the analysis
of the dissent focused on sexual intimacy in general, rather than on
homosexual sodomy exclusively. 61 Additionally, the dissent con-
strued prior precedent broadly so as to include all forms of sexual
activity within the right of privacy. 6 2 Further, the dissent rejected
the majority's historical justification for upholding the constitu-
tionality of the statute,'6 3 as well as its assertion that the statute
could be validated under the rational basis test by reference to ma-
157 Id. at 196.
"' See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59 See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "A fair reading of the statute and of the com-
plaint clearly reveals that the majority has distorted the question this case presents." Id. at
200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"' See'id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to Justice Blackmun, the case involves
"'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely,
'the right to be let alone.'" Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). "The Court's failure to
comprehend the magnitude of the liberty interests at stake in this case leads it to slight the
question whether ... the State ... has justified [its] ... infringement on these interests."
Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"' See id. at 199-214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1'2 See id. at 203-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent focused on the reasons
certain rights are protected under the due process clause, namely, because such rights "form
so central a part of an individual's life," not because they contribute to the general public
welfare. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent recognized that sexual intimacy
forms a central part of an individual's life and of his self-definition. See id. at 205 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Therefore, the dissent found that there is a fundamental right to con-
trol the nature of one's intimate associations with others, id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing), as well as a right to conduct intimate relationships in the privacy of one's own home.
Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, quoting Justice Holmes,
stated:
[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAav. L. REv. 457,
469 (1897)).
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jority viewpoints of morality.'"
The majority and dissenting opinions in Bowers can be ex-
plained in terms of the perspective from which Mr. Hardwick's ac-
tivity was viewed. These perspectives, as embodied in competing
baselines, reflect both political and moral value judgments.
Underlying the majority's baseline was a political value em-
bodied within the status quo, i.e., the preservation of society in its
existing form.165 The right to privacy, therefore, was perceived as
protecting only "traditional" forms of relationships. 16 The major-
ity's baseline encompassed a moral viewpoint as well, i.e., that ho-
mosexual activity is immoral and therefore properly punishable., 7
These value judgments were hidden within the Court's discourse,
which focused on the historical treatment of homosexuals.168
It is possible that the majority proceeded with its baseline
premise that there is no constitutional right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy because it failed to recognize the perspective of Mr.
Hardwick. 6 9 Instead, it viewed the activity at issue solely from its
own perspective. It can be argued that the majority neglected to
1" See id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[The fact that the governing majority in
a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice." Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at
211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Petitioner 20) ("[t]he assertion that 'tradi-
tional Judeo-Christian values proscribe' the conduct involved ... cannot provide an ade-
quate justification for [the statute]").
" See Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1099 (1988). Professor
Goldstein has labeled this underlying political philosophy "classical conservatism." See id.
at 1091.
"I See id. at 1101.
167 See Comment, Constitutional Law - An Imposition of the Justices' Own Moral
Choices - Bowers v. Hardwick, 9 WHrrriER L. REV. 115, 116 (1987).
,08 See Goldstein, supra note 165, at 1102. The majority imposed its own values on the
states "under a cloak of historical intervention." Id.
The Court's portrayal of the historical treatment of homosexuality was largely mislead-
ing in that its analysis applied to heterosexual as well as homosexual activity. Id. at 1081-86.
For example, heterosexual and homosexual sodomy were equally condemned at common
law. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the histories of the stat-
utes referred to by the Court, as well as the history of the Georgia statute, reveal traditional
prohibitions against heterosexual and homosexual sodomy alike. Id. at 215-16. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). "[Tihe majority's depiction of eighteenth and nineteenth-century views of sod-
omy is too flawed to guide constitutional interpretation." Goldstein, supra note 165, at 1082.
16' See Henderson, supra note 48, at 1577. According to Professor Henderson, "Bowers
v. Hardwick [is] an example of the complete failure of empathy in a decision." Id.; see also
Black, "One Nation Indivisible": Unnamed Human Rights in the States, 65 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 17, 54 n.58 (1991) (analyzing Bowers in light of Declaration of Independence's commit-
ment to "the pursuit of happiness").
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consider that to Mr. Hardwick, the activity in which he was engag-
ing was sexual intimacy, not something perverse or abnormal. 170
The underlying political value reflected in the dissent's base-
line is the autonomy of the individual.17  Accordingly, the right to
privacy was interpreted as encompassing the right of autonomy 17 2
or, as articulated by Justice Blackmun, the right to choose how to
conduct one's intimate associations. 7  The dissent's baseline also
reflected a different vision of sexual morality, that is, the view that
"there may be many 'right' ways of conducting" intimate relation-
ships. 17 4 The dissent thus asserted that the statute could not be
upheld based on majority notions of morality. 75
It is likely the dissent embraced the perspective of Mr. Hard-
wick, recognizing that his conduct was quite normal to him. 76
Based on such a perspective, the dissent was able to conclude that
both heterosexual and homosexual activity constitute normal
forms of "intimate associations," falling within the protected
sphere of the right to privacy.17 7
170 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that there are "many
'right' ways of conducting [intimate sexual] relationships").
'7 See Goldstein, supra note 165, at 1099; see also Henderson, supra note 48, at 1649.
("Blackmun was speaking for humans and for the positive values of a liberal state-respect
for human freedom from oppression and" tyranny"). According to this view, the individual's
freedom to behave as he chooses cannot be limited, except to prevent harm to others. Gold-
stein, supra note 165, at 1092. The dissent, therefore, feared government enforcement of
majority values on the minority and the resulting limitation on individual autonomy. Id. at
1100.
:72 See Goldstein, supra note 165, at 1100.
17" Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[A] necessary corollary of giving individuals
freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individ-
uals will make different choices." Id. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent rec-
ognized that not all religious groups condemn homosexual activity. See id. at 211 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
17 See supra note 164. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that strict scrutiny may
be warranted in the case of legislation that reflects "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.. . ." United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). As pointed out by Professor Conkle, "[tihe interests of
homosexuals as a group clearly stand at a serious disadvantage in American politics. Be-
cause homosexuals are regarded by many as moral deviants and social misfits, their argu-
ments in the political process are likely to be discounted, if not entirely ignored." Conkle,
The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 225 (1987); see also Wat-
kins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1457 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(hateful discrimination against particular group nonjusticiable on basis that society
disapproves).
178 See Henderson, supra note 48, at 1647. "The dissenters saw the human issues." Id.
1 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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It is possible that if the majority failed to recognize the per-
spective of Mr. Hardwick, it reached its decision solely based on its
own moral and ethical values. Indeed, given the Court's baseline, it
is likely that, from the outset, Mr. Hardwick had little chance of
prevailing.
Had the Justices viewed the claims in DeShaney and Bowers
from all possible perspectives, perhaps both cases would have been
decided differently. However, even if the same conclusions were
reached, the mere express recognition of the various relevant per-
spectives may have resulted in a more "meaningful debate on the
merits1 7 8 and more candid decisions.
III. CONCLUSION
Perspectives, as embodied in baselines, critically impact the
judicial decision-making process and affect the outcome of cases
through the medium of legal discourse. This Note has asserted that
judges should expressly recognize the existence and operation of
their own perspectives, as well as the perspectives of others in their
decisions. Clearly, the more viewpoints incorporated into any anal-
ysis, the more informed the discourse. It follows that the more en-
lightened the discourse, the more just the resolution. Justice, after
all, depends on engaging multiple, competing visions.
Anna T. Majewicz
18 Leading Cases, supra note 122, at 176. Abandoning the quest for neutrality may
lead to "meaningful discussions as to . . . what values deserve constitutional protection
under what circumstances." Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at 99.
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